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Newsletter #169 A call to resist illegitimate authority October 1984 
The Nicaraguan Election and the 
Problem of Democracy 
FRANK BRODHEAD 
Wm the Nicaraguan election be a 
"free election"? In this Orwellian year 
much of our political life is inevitably 
dominated by the struggle to call things 
by their true names. Thus we have 
missiles that are ''peacekeepers'' and 
an economic "recovery" that has 
brought destitution to millions. In 
Orwell's Ministry of Truth we see our 
own Great Communicator. 
One casualty of the Orwellian on-
slaught has been free elections. In 
many instances - especially in U.S. 
client states - "free elections" are 
best understood as a form of theater. 
Featuring ''the threat of rebel disrup-
tion," a spate of free elections has held 
our media spellbound, staggered that 
such marvelous and courageous dis-
plays of democracy could be staged un-
der such adverse conditions. El Salva-
dor has had two such successes in only 
two years; and well-received produc-
tions have been staged by the theater 
companies of Turkey, the Philippines, 
and Guatemala. President Reagan 
hopes that his new Grenadean troupe 
will be able to perform a free-election 
drama in time to aid his own re-
election efforts this November. 
While these performances differ in 
certain ways, each of the current wave 
of free-election dramas is concerned to 
demonstrate to skeptical audiences that 
democracy is alive and well in the host 
country. In many cases, such as the 
1982 election in El Salvador, this 
demonstration function was its 
primary purpose, and was even more 
important than the selection of one 
candidate over another. For this reason 
the Salvadoran election and others of 
the same type may be called demon-
stration elections. 1 
It is obvious that the governments of 
Turkey, El Salvador, or the Philippines 
do not need to stage an election drama 
in order to inform their own citizens 
about the state of democracy in their 
country. They know this only too well. 
Rather, the audience targeted by a 
demonstration election is the U.S. 
media and "informed opinion," and 
through them the U.S. public. The pur-
pose of the election drama is to ensure 
that U.S. public opinion will continue 
to acquiesce in keeping the military aid 
pipeline open, silencing critics who 
would cut off such aid or make it con-
tingent on improvements in human 
rights. Because of the deep devotion of 
our leaders to democracy, and thus 
free elections, U .S.-sponsored military 
dictatorships must stage free election 
dramas from time to time in return for 
our advisers and helicopters. They 
must sing for their supper. 
The Nicaraguan Election 
Is the Nicaraguan election also a 
"demonstration election"? Clearly it 
has some demonstration qualities. 
That this is so reflects in part the suc-
cess of the Reagan administration's 
destabilization efforts against 
Nicaragua. The counterpart of 
U.S.-supported terrorism and sabotage 
against Nicaragua has been an ag-
gressive PR campaign to show that 
Nicaragua's Sandinista government is 
repressive and fast becoming 
Continued on Page Three 
Dumping Reagan 
' 'Now after a decade of near 
isolationism when even the hint of 
military action brought denunciations 
of 'planning for another Vietnam' we 
can realistically think about the use of 
force again." 
These are the recent words of Pen-
tagon systems analyst Mark Cancian. 
However, judging from its actions, it is 
clear that the Reagan administration is 
not only thinking about the use of 
force, but is carefully and methodically 
planning a major military intervention 
in Central America. 
A study by Theodore Moran, Direc-
tor of Georgetown University's Inter-
national Diplomacy and Trade Pro-
gram, recommends a five-year plan for 
military action in Nicaragua that 
would include an invasion, bombings, 
occupations and pacification. Accord-
ing to Moran, 61,000 soldiers, 216 
planes, 734 helicopters, tanks and 
other material would be employed at a 
cost of over $10 billion. It is estimated 
that 4,780 U.S . troops would be killed 
and 18,600 wounded. David Mac-
Michael, a former CIA agent in Cen-
tral America who recently left the 
agency, has stated that the Regan ad-
ministration will try to stage a situation 
in the region in an attempt to win over 
public opinion for ari invasion. San-
dinista leaders have warned that one 
option the U.S. has considered is to 
assassinate one or more members of 
the FSLN National Directorate and 
thus, justify an invasion similar to the 
one in Grenada last October. 
The people of Nicaragua have taken 
these threats very seriously and believe 
that a U.S. invasion is inevitable if 
Reagan is re-elected. In Nicaragua, 
every neighborhood (except for a few 
upper-middle class areas) is organized 
and armed on a block-by-block level. 
Similarly, Cuba has recently stated that 
a U.S. naval blockade and/or invasion 
of the island is a possibility in the near 
future if Reagan is elected. Neighbor-
hood militias have been mobilized 
there as well. 
The readers of this newsletter do not 
need to be reminded of all the effects 
of Reagan 's policies or the conse-
quences of another four years with him 
in the White House. In the simplest 
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terms, a Reagan victory on Nov. 6 will 
mean increased and unnecessary suf-
fering, death, destruction and repres-
sion on a massive scale both at home 
and in the Third World. Accordingly, 
an all-out effort must be made to dump 
Reagan. 
Between now and November 6, 
Dump-Reagan coalitions that include 
everyone from Marxist-Leninists . to 
moderate Democrats will be working 
to register voters, raise important issues 
and mobilize people through marches, 
door-to-door canvassing, and public 
forums. It is essential that the urgency 
of the current situation be felt and 
acted on. Although the immediate goal 
is to defeat Reagan, all electoral work 
must be put in the context of building a 
broad-based radical movement that 
will continue to fight both Republicans 
and Democrats, become powerful 
enough to stop the geared-up war 
machine, and create a just society at 
home. • 
Resist Newsletter 
Correction: In the July/ August issue 
of the Resist Newsletter we announced 
that Resist had new board members, 
one of whom is Rene Valle. The an-
nouncement read that Rene has travel-
ed throughout the U.S. creating a link 
between the FDR/FMLN, Salvadorans 
living in the U.S., and the solidarity 
movement. This is incorrect. A cor-
rected version reads: Rene is a 
Salvadoran activist who is currently a 
staff person at Casa El Salvador-
Farabundo Marti in Cambridge Massa-
chusetts. He has traveled throughout 
the U.S. creating a link between the 
people of El Salvador and the people 
of the United States. 
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The Nicaraguan Election 
''totalitarian.'' The purpose of this 
propaganda campaign is to undercut 
U.S. opponents of continued congres-
sional support for the "covert" war, 
and to persuade the leaders of our 
allies in Europe to reduce aid and trade 
with Nicaragua, forcing Nicaragua in-
to further dependency on the Soviet 
bloc. Thus Nicaragua's election has 
some demonstration qualities in that it 
is being held earlier than originally 
scheduled in order to maintain interna-
tional support. 
What kind of election will this be? 
Will it be a genuinely free election or, 
as Secretary of State George Shultz put 
it, will it be "a sham, Soviet-style" 
election? 
Earlier this year Secretary of State 
Shultz ably outlined some of the 
characteristics of a free election. Testi-
fying before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on February 22, 1984, 
Shultz maintained that for elections to 
be democratic ''rival political groups'' 
must be allowed "to form themselves 
and have access to people, to have the 
right of assembly, to have access to the 
media.' Earlier, speaking in response 
to Nicaragua's announcement of elec-
tions, Shultz said that "the important 
thing is that if there is to be an electoral 
process, it be observed not only at the 
moment when people vote, but in all 
the preliminary aspects that make an 
election really mean something" (New 
York Times, February 6, 1984). 
Nothing could be more true. A genu-
inely free election is not only a matter 
of uncoerced balloting, but also re-
quires an open electoral campaign. 
More broadly, a democratic election 
presupposes that for a substantial per-
iod prior to the election the nation's 
political lifeblood flows strongly and 
that citizens actively participate in or-
ganizations of their own choosing to 
debate (and act on) their ideas about 
how they want to govern themselves. 
Nor can a free election be ensured by 
jetting in various famous people as 
"observers," who arrive a few days be-
fore the election, see no one beaten in 
front of them and observe no ballot-
box stuffing, and then return home to 
give the election a clear bill of health. 
As Shultz observed, it is not the 
moment of balloting, but "all the pre-
liminary aspects that make an election 
really mean something." 
Nevertheless, despite their pro-
foundity, Shultz's observations raise 
several issues. The first is their source. 
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It is the height of hypocrisy for an ar-
chitect of the U.S. war against 
Nicaragua - illegal by our own stan-
dards and according to International 
law - to measure Nicaraguan demo-
cracy according to his own criteria. 
Nor should the Conqueror of Grenada 
be allowed to speak unchallenged 
about self-determination. 
Second, it must be recalled that 
Shultz was making his comments about 
free elections just weeks prior to the 
U .S.-sponsored election in El Salva-
dor. While Shultz did not address the 
applicability of his views to the 
Salvadorian election, we can do it for 
him. 
Both El Salvador and Nicaragua are 
governed under a State of Siege which 
severely abridges rights of speech, 
assembly, and the press. The State of 
Siege in El Salvador was imposed in 
March 1980, simultaneously with the 
U.S.-designed land reform program. 
The State of Siege in Nicaragua was 
begun in 1982 after the contra attacks 
began. In Nicaragua an opposition 
press exists, though it is censored; but 
censorship is to be lifted for the elec-
tion campaign, parties contesting the 
election will be allowed time on gov-
ernment-owned radio and TV, and 
they will receive an electoral subsidy to 
finance their campaigns. In El Sal-
vador the independent or opposition 
press was destroyed by 1981, through 
terror and assassination. The elections 
in El Salvador were carried out in a 
climate of terror, as 40,000 citizens had 
been murdered by Death Squads con-
nected to the government and the 
military, and as General Garcia - the 
head of the Army - had just an-
nounced that not to vote was 
"treason." No such terror exists in 
Nicaragua except that created by the 
contras. Even the Nicaraguan Human 
Rights Commission, an opponent of 
the Sandinista government, claims for 
1983 only 1,000 arrests, 209 disap-
pearances, and 15 killings (Manchester 
Guardian Weekly, May 27, 1984). 
Thus the most elementary examina-
tion of the ''preliminary aspects that 
make an election really mean some-
thing'' indicate that the Nicaraguan 
election will be far more free than the 
Salvadoran elections of 1982 and 1984. 
Why does much of the U.S. public 
think the opposite? This introduces the 
role of the media in making demon-
stration elections possible, and we mav 
Resist Newsletter 
suggest the following Law of Media 
Coverage: 
Whenever a demonstration election oc-
curs within the U.S. sphere of in-
fluence, the absence of all the neces-
sary preconditions for a democratic 
election - free speech, the right to 
organize, the right not to vote, etc. -
are strictly off the agenda of the U.S. 
media. Whenever a critical election oc-
curs outside the U.S. sphere and in the 
enemy camp, the alleged absence of 
these preconditions are featured by our 
media to the exclusion of all else. 
Thus in the Polish local elections of 
June 1984, for example, the U.S. 
media correctly emphasized the com-
plete absence of the most elementary 
democratic rights, and paid no atten-
tion to the fact that election-day events 
went smoothly or that no one was 
visibly coerced to vote. On the con-
trary, U.S. television networks gave 
prominent coverage to spokesmen 
from the remnants of Solidarity as they 
explained the ways in which the elec-
tion was a fraud. (It goes without say-
ing that no Salvadoran guerrillas were 
given the opportunity to explain to a 
U.S. television audience the ways in 
which the Salvadoran election was not 
truly democratic.) 
A corollary to the Law of Media 
Coverage concerns the mechanics of 
the election and the election-day 
events. In a U .S.-sponsored demon-
stration election, such as the Salvador-
an election, the U.S. media focuses on 
the mechanics of voting - whether 
everyone has a ballot, is the voter 
registration list complete, etc. - while 
such issues are of little interest to the 
U.S. media in an "enemy" election 
such as the one in Poland. This is par-
ticularly true for the question of voter 
turnout. In a U.S.-supported 
demonstration election, a high voter 
turnout indicates that the choices of-
fered to the voters are popular, and 
that the government offering these 
choices is supported by the people. At 
the same time, a high voter turnout is a 
rejection for the guerrillas, who have 
denounced the election and are pic-
tured as trying to disrupt it. But in an 
election outside the U.S. sphere, a high 
voter turnout is a sign of government 
coercsion and fraud. 
These observations are confirmed by 
a systematic tabulation of New York 
Times coverage of the Nicaraguan and 
Continued on Page Four 
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The Nicaraguan Election 
Salvadoran elections made by Edward 
S. Herman in early 1984. According to 
his count, between February 1 and 
March 30, 1984, the Times ran 28 news 
articles on the Salvadoran election and 
eight on the Nicaraguan election. 
(Recall that this was the period leading 
up to the Salvadoran election, while 
that in Nicaragua was still eight 
months away.) Herman found that 
80% of the articles on the Salvadoran 
election depended for their sources on 
U.S. or Salvadoran officials, while on-
ly 1 % of the sources quoted were 
peasants and 10% were rebels. Not sur-
prisingly, the articles overwhelmingly 
reflected those themes compatible with 
the demonstration intent of the elec-
tion, stressing the threat of rebel 
disruption, the mechanics of the elec-
tion and official hopes for the election. 
In accord with our Law of Media 
Coverage, the following topics were 
not mentioned: freedom of the press, 
freedom to organize, the possibility 
that not voting might be 
dangerous, fraud in the 1982 election, 
or any limits on the ability of can-
didates to qualify and campaign. Issues 
mentioned in only one of the 28 articles 
included the existence of the state of 
siege and the fact that the ballot boxes 
were transparent. In covering the 
Nicaraguan election, however, the 
Times relied first on U.S. officials, 
secondly on the Nicaraguan opposi-
tion, and last on Nicaraguan gov-
ernment officials. Not surprisingly, 
there was no mention of the threat of 
rebel disruption; instead the articles 
stressed limits on the freedom of the 
press and the right to organize, qualify, 
and campaign for office. 2 
Thus the most sketchy analysis suf-
fices to show that the Reagan ad-
ministration's concern about 
democracy and elections in Nicaragua 
are part of a propaganda system, and 
we may safely predict that the U.S. 
media will be guided by this propagan-
da system in its coverage of the 
Nicaraguan elections, employing the 
Law of Media Coverage and its cor-
ollaries on election-day events and 
voter turnout. 
Popular Democracy 
It is possible to view Nicaragua's 
election in another light, placing it in 
the historical context of popular 
revolutions which have attempted to 
consolodate themselves in the face of 
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foreign intervention or externally spon-
sored civil war. Though we do not have 
room here to do more than suggest a 
few themes, it is useful to recall that 
the French, Russian, and Cuban 
revolutions had some of the following 
similarities: 
• A popular revolution swept away 
an old order that was oppressive, 
regressive, and corrupt; 
• the work of the revolution itself 
was carried out by a popular move-
ment, not simply a tiny vanguard; 
and that in the days following the 
overthrow of the government a 
great burst of popular enthusiasm 
ensued, in which masses of people 
organized themselves into every 
conceivable kind of organization 
with the intention of governing 
themselves as directly as possible. 
• The mere existence of this revolu-
tion was considered a danger by the 
revolutionary regimes conservative 
neighbors, and they set about to 
subvert or overthrow it and restore 
the old order. 
• The resulting war had two some-
what opposing impacts on the 
revolutionary nation: it greatly in-
creased the authoritarian nature of 
the new political leadership; and it 
required this leadership to arm the 
nation and enlist the energies of as 
many people as possible in defend-
ing and governing the country. 
This last point is where Nicaragua is 
now at, and it indicates the great 
The Resist Pledge System 
The most important source of Resist's 
income is monthly pledges. Pledges 
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us 
a minimum monthly income. In turn, 
pledges receive a monthly reminder let-
ter (in addition to the newsletter) which 
contains news of recent grants . and 
other Resist activities. So take the 
plunge and become a Resist pledge! 
Yes, I would like to pledge S 
monthly to the work of Resist. 
Name ___________ _ 
Address __________ _ 
City ___ State __ Zip, ___ _ 
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responsibility that citizens of the 
United States have in the future of 
Nicaraguan democracy, for only we 
can end the war. 
Because of the U.S.-sponsored 
counterrevolution against Nicaragua, 
the Sandinista revolution is now at a 
crossroads where the requirements of 
national defense strain at the fabric of 
popular democracy. The democracy 
envisioned by Nicaragua's base com-
munities and popular movements is 
unlikely to survive a long war. It is this 
popular democracy which is the real 
enemy of the Reagan administration. 
If we care about democracy in 
Nicaragua we must end the war. 
1. This concept is spelled out in 
detail in Edward S. Herman and Frank 
Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: 
U.S. -Staged Elections in the 
Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador (South End Press, 1984). 
2. Edward S. Herman, "The New 
York Times on the 1984 Salvadoran 
and Nicaraguan Elections," Covert 
Action Information Bulletin, Number 
21 (Spring, 1984), pp. 7-13. 
Frank Brodhead, a member of the 
Resist board, co-authored a book with 
Edward. S. Herman entitled: 
Demonstration Elections: U .S.-Staged 
Elections in the Dominican Republic, 
Vietnam, and El Salvador (South End 
Press, 1984). 
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Election Information 
It is not coincidence that the 
Nicaraguan elections for choosing a 
President, Vice-President and 
90-member assembly will be held four 
days before the U.S. elections. The 
date was moved up so that the election 
would legitamize the Nicaraguan 
revolution internationally, thus 
creating another obstacle for Reagan 
to justify a direct military intervention 
if he is re-elected. Already several 
groups and nations have expressed sup-
port for the elections in Nicaragua. A 
statement in August by Nobel Prize 
winners Linus Pauling, Adolfo 
Esquivel, George Wald and Betty 
Williams stated: "Nicaragua is making 
all efforts possible to hold free, open 
and honest elections." According to 
Nicaraguan newspapers and press re-
leases, the following nations have ex-
pressed support for the Nicaraguan 
elections: Brazil, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Australia, Columbia, 
Bolivia, Panama, Ecuador, Spain, 
Sweden, France, the Eastern-bloc 
countries and the Socialist Interna-
tional. 
The electoral process in Nicaragua 
began in late July when over 1.5 
million out of approximately 1.6 
million eligible voters complied with 
the law and registered to vote. (Unlike 
in El Salvador, the law does not require 
citizens to vote - only to register to 
vote.) During the registration cam-
paign the election boards were attacked 
by U.S.-backed contras, eight com-
pesinos were murdered and four elec-
toral officials were wounded. 
The FSLN and six other parties 
registered their candidates while a 
coalition of four other parties in-
cluding the Social Democrats, Social 
Christians, Liberal Constitutionalists 
and Conservative parties called the 
Democratic Coordinating Committee 
(DCC) refused to participate until the 
other parties accepted their list of 
demands. One of the demands was that 
all the parties in Nicaragua have a "na-
tional dialogue'' which would include 
counter-revolutionary leaders based in 
Honduras and Costa Rica who had ex-
pressed support for Arturo Cruz, the 
leader of the DCC. A few days before 
the deadline for parties to register Cruz 
returned to Nicaragua after confering 
with State Department officials in the 
U.S. After considerable fanfare and in-
ternational media coverage, the four 
right-wing parties continued to press 
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for their demand of a "national 
dialogue" that would include the con-
tras. The FSLN and the six other 
registered parties refused to talk with 
the contras and the parties of the DCC 
lost their status as political parties by 
missing an extended deadline to 
register for the elections. 
In Nicaragua, the popular view of 
Arturo Cruz and the DCC is that they 
are stooges of the CIA. Even the 
Washington Post has described the 
committee as very poorly organized 
and incapable of serving as a political 
alternative in Nicaragua. The Post also 
speculated that the four right-wing par-
ties never truly considered partici-
pating in the elections because they are 
counting on the CIA's "secret" war to 
allow them to take power. 
The six parties other than the FSLN 
participating in the elections are: 
The Conservative Democratic Party -
This party split off from the conser-
vative Party in 1956. With the motto 
"God, Order and Justice", its 23 point 
platform includes an economic policy 
that calls for a ''social pact'' between 
public and private sectors so that 
"private enterprise can operate with-
out fear.'' The party says it will try to 
convince the private sector to share its 
wealth with workers and thus, prevent 
worker exploitation. 
Marxist-Leninist Popular Action 
Movement - The party was founded 
in 1972 by revolutionary students. The 
Workers' Front is its union organiza-
tion and during the struggle against 
Somoza the Anti-Somoza Popular 
Militia was its armed wing. Their pro-
gram advocates doing away with 
capitalist production relation by force. 
It opposes the mixed economy of the 
Sandinistas, considering it to be a 
social pact that primarily benefits big 
business. The party characterizes the 
current Sandinista process as 
bourgeoise. 
Socialist Party - This party was 
founded in 1944 and was illegal during 
its first 35 years under Somoza. It is a 
member party of the Patriotic Revolu-
tionary Front along with the Popular 
Social Christians and the FSLN. It 
calls for national economic planning in 
accordance with existing economic and 
human needs resources. It calls for 
''ridding the state administration of 
bureacracy and strengthening a foreign 
policy of peace independence and non-
alignment and developing and deepen-
Resist Newsletter 
ing of popular, democratic and revolu-
tionary unity." 
Communist Party - This party grew 
out of a split with the Nicaraguan 
Socialist Party in 1967. The platform 
seeks establishment of a democratic, 
patriotic government led by com-
munists whose basic function would be 
to create conditions for the construc-
tion of socialism as the path towards 
communism. It favors radical agrarian 
reform and restructuring the economy, 
trade relations and financial policies 
and rejects the obligation to pay 
foreign debts inherited from Somoza. 
Popular Social Christian Party - This 
party, which is also a member of the 
Patriotic Revolutionary Front emerged 
in 1976 as a splinter group from the 
Social Christian Party and proposes a 
mixed economy with a non-aligned 
foreign policy. They advocate easing 
relations between church and state and 
replacing the Sandinista Defense Com-
mittees with neighborhood councils. 
Independent Liberal Party -This par-
ty was formed in 1946 and considers 
itself a third way for Nicaragua "be-
tween the conservative parties that seek 
a return to the past and the left-wing 
parties that are totalitarian and sec-
tarian.'' 
, Presently, the campaigns of the 
seven parties are in full gear. Because 
of contra attacks a state of emergency 
has existed in Nicaragua since 1982 but 
for the election period civil liberties 
have been broadened, censorship has 
been lifted (except for military infor-
mation), the right to hold public 
meetings and distribute political pro-
paganda has been restored. Con-
siderable state financing is available to 
all parties as is a proportion of time on 
state-owned radio and TV. Dozens of 
nations will be on hand to observe the 
elections and Nicaragua has invited 20 
U.S. Congresspeople (10 Republicans 
and 10 Democrats) to observe the pro-
cess. 
While Reagan will do everything in 
his power to delegitimize the election in 
Nicaragua, two things are sure to hap-
pen: the election will receive broad in-
ternational recognition and the FSLN 
and Daniel Ortega will win a greater 
percentage of the eligible electorate in 
Nicaragua than Reagan will win in the 
U.S. 
Ken Tangvik 
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The Jackson Campaign in 
the South 
ANNE BRADEN 
It was August, at a rally in Newburg, 
Ky., just outside Louisville, where I 
live. Adlene Abstain, a Black woman 
long involved in civil-rights activity, 
was campaigning for the state legisla-
ture, her first try for public office. 
"This is what Jesse Jackson's cam-
paign was all about,'' Louisville grass-
roots Black leader Mattie Jones told 
the gathering. "He said the same key 
we used to vote for him unlocks the 
legislature, the U.S. Senate door. We'll 
keep winning in Kentucky.'' 
The crowd - mostly Black, but in-
cluding a few equally enthusiastic 
whites - cheered. 
Then Bill Allison, progressive white 
lawyer, Kentucky field organizer in the 
Jackson campaign, spoke. He said: 
"Many of us whites are learning that 
when Blacks gain, we gain; when 
Blacks win, we win.'' The crowd 
cheered again. 
Multiply that scene many times - in 
some places, perhaps minus the white 
participation - and you get a picture 
of the South today, in the wake of 
Jesse Jackson's historic run for the 
presidency. 
The Jackson campaign swept 
through the South like a tornado, 
brought almost a million voters out to 
the primaries and caucuses, stimulated 
scores of Blacks to run for local office, 
injected life-and-death domestic and 
international issues into grass-roots 
political discussion, and launched a 
new people's movement. There has 
been nothing like it since the 1960's -
or, perhaps more accurately, since 
Reconstruction over 100 years ago. 
The 1960's movements were protests; 
this, like the post-Civil-War revolu-
tion, is a bid for power. It is a move-
ment that calls for totally new direc-
tions for government, nationally and 
locally, for a humane society where 
people come first and foreign policies 
based on respect for all the world's 
people. 
"This was not just an election cam-
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paign," says Rev. C.T. Vivian of 
Atlanta, Jackson's deputy director for 
clergy. "It's a moral and political 
movement that will continue, run can-
didates on platforms that we want, and 
hold them responsible." 
The national news media never ade-
quately conveyed the strength of Jack-
son's Southern campaign. Jackson 
won 4 states and the District of Colum-
bia in his race for the nomination; all 
four of the states he won were in the 
South. 
Maybe that stunning fact got lost be-
cause three were caucus states, in addi-
tion to Louisiana, where we won the 
primary with 43 percent of the vote. In 
caucus states, the "popular vote" is 
the number of people who attend first-
level caucuses where every voter can 
participate. Thus, Jackson won in 
Virginia with 32 percent of the turnout; 
in Mississippi with 45 percent; in South 
Carolina, with 25 percent. 
He got 25 percent in the North 
Carolina and Tennessee primaries, 21 
percent in Georgie, 19.6 percent in 
Alabama; 7 percent in West Virginia, 
with 3 percent Black population. In 
other caucus states, he won 35 percent 
in Texas; 26 percent in Kentucky (7 
percent Black population), and ran just 
400 votes behind Mondale in Arkansas. 
We won 30 Southern congressional 
districts, and we won the cities: Atlanta 
Resist News/el/er 
(48 percent of the vote); Nashville, 
Memphis, Chattanooga in Tennessee; 
Durham, Greensboro, Winstom-Salem 
in North Carolina; Louisville and Lex-
ington in Kentucky; and many others. 
But statistics alone do not convey the 
enthusiasm in the South's Black com-
munities. People who had never voted 
before came out in mass. They jammed 
caucus sites to overflowing. In the leg-
islative district where I live, people be-
gan arriving at 8:30 a.m. for a 2 p.m. 
caucus, packed the large church base-
ment, and 200 people never got in. 
State Rep. Tyronne Brooks, Jackson 
chair in Georgia, describes the fervor: 
"We had no paid staff and not one 
radio or TV ad; we didn't get a cent 
from the Washington office until just 
before our primary. But we had 500 
volunteers in and out of our Atlanta 
office everyday, and we raised 
$300,000 for the national campaign." 
Part of the enthusiasm was simply a 
response to a Black man making a 
viable campaign for the presidency. 
That in itself was a giant step forward 
in the long struggle of Blacks for free-
dom, and suddenly anything seemed 
possible. But no one thinks just any 
Black candidate could have generated 
this enthusiasm. It was also what Jack-
son was saying. Finally people were 
hearing a candidate speaking directly 
to their lives and needs. 
"You can call it Reverand Jackson's 
charisma,'' says Cleveland Sellers, 
Jackson southeast regional coordina-
tor. "But that charisma is based on his 
historic involvement, his commitment 
and, most of all, what he says. He 
talked about the issues that affect peo-
ple's lives - jobs, peace, the military 
budget, the locked-out. Some of it was 
controversial, but he put it out there in 
ways people could relate to. They had 
been waiting for this, and suddenly 
they had hope." 
Scott Douglas, Birmingham commu-
nity organizer, says the Jackson cam-
paign became a "mass voter education 
movement." 
''For the first time, average people 
on the streets are talking about critical 
issues facing the country - what's 
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wrong with the economy, foreign 
policy," Douglas says. "They are talk-
ing about South Africa, the Middle 
East, Central America. Not that they 
didn't know some of these things be-
fore. But Jackson put it all together, he 
related the anti-people policies at home 
to the anti-people foreign policies. 
These are lessons people won't 
forget." 
As this is written in August, it's too 
soon to predict what force this new 
movement will have in the November 
election, or what future form it will 
take. Many Jackson delegates came 
home from the Democratic National 
Convention disillusioned, because of 
the defeat of Jackson's platform 
planks and highhanded treatment from 
Democratic Party leaders. 
Many others, however - and this is 
the view I share - maintain that we 
really won in San Francisco. We in-
jected a moral dimension into the pro-
ceedings. From the most visible na-
tional platform we've ever had for pro-
gressive politics, we raised the most 
crucial issues of our time - the issue of 
war and peace in the Jackson platform 
planks calling for "no-first-use" and 
cuts in military spending; and the issue 
of justice at home in the planks on 
meaningful affirmative action and en-
forcement of the Voting Rights Act. 
And Jackson spoke for our movement 
from the convention podium to an au-
dience of 22 million TV viewers. 
If one views the convention as one 
more step in building a people's move-
ment that can indeed change the na-
tion's direction, we won. Jackson him-
self told us to view it this way - and 
declared that the Rainbow Coalition 
will go on as a permanent force in the 
nation's politics. One only had to sense 
the energy present at a pre-convention 
conference of 350 Jackson leaders 
from 40 states in Chicago at the end of 
June, and at the delegate meetings in 
San Francisco, to know that this move-
ment will not go away. 
Of course skeptics down-play Jack-
son's strength in the South by noting 
that Jackson did well because many 
white voters stayed home. 
''The candidate they are for was not 
on the ballot in these primaries," said 
one Deep South politician. 
There is truth in that, and the 
November election may tell that story, 
which brings us to the critical question 
for those of us who are white. What is 
our role in this campaign, and what 
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should it be in the future? 
First, we must realize that the mass 
media gave a totally distorted picture 
of Jackson's Rainbow Coalition. Over 
and over we heard that the Rainbow 
was not working, that Jackson's only 
significant support came from Blacks. 
That was just not true. The cam-
paign made major inroads into the His-
panic and Asian-American communi-
ties, and Native Americans came out in 
force. 
Certainly, whites were the Rainbow's 
weakest stripe. But whites did vote for 
Jackson - about 750,000 of them, or 
22 percent of his total vote. Whites 
worked in the campaign in every 
Southern state, in some places in con-
siderable numbers. For example, in 
Louisville, about 100 whites were ac-
tive. 
Andrew Kopkind and Alexander 
Cockburn wrote recently in The Nation 
that the "left" (meaning the white left) 
totally rejected the opportunity Jack-
son's campaign offered. I don't know 
who they count as ''left.'' They men-
tioned the National Organization for 
Women. It does important work, but I 
never think of it as "left." It's true 
that many white women's groups never 
grasped the significance of the Jackson 
movement and still don't seem to un-
derstand that Geraldine Ferraro would 
not be on the ticket if Jackson had not 
opened up the political process. (But-
tons reading, "Ferraro, Thank Jesse 
Jackson'' sold like hotcakes on San 
Francisco streets.) But I know many 
feminists, including NOW members, 
who supported Jackson in their com-
munities. 
White peace organizations present 
another mixed picture. Most national 
peace organizations did not endorse 
Jackson. Some gave tax-exemption as 
the reason, but there were ways they 
could have moved despite this. The 
more likely reason, especially with the 
more conservative single-issue groups, 
was that after long deploring the lack 
of Blacks in white-led peace actions, 
they couldn't recognize a new mass 
peace movement when they saw one -
when it arose form the Black com-
munity. That, in part, was what the 
Jackson campaign was, a mass new 
anti-war movement which Jackson 
took into the by-ways of America. 
But despite all this, individual 
leaders and activists in peace organiza-
tions came out for Jackson in com-
munity after community. And virtually 
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every white leftist I know in the South 
supported the campaign. 
Our failures as whites in the Jackson 
campaign is not that we weren't there 
but that we did not reach out ade-
quately to the mass white community. 
This campaign offered an unprecedent-
ed opportunity to cut away the blinders 
imposed by centuries of racism and 
show white people that here was a can-
didate speaking to their deepest needs. 
Collectively we failed to take advan-
tage of that historic opportunity. That 
is reflected in the low percentage of 
white voters for Jackson in most states 
- 2 percent in Georgia, 4 percent in 
North Carolina, etc. (although more in 
the cities, 10 percent in Atlanta, 8 per-
cent in Durham, etc.). 
We need to analyze that failure. It 
goes back to the syndrome that has al-
ways plagued interracial movements: 
whites who become involved seem re-
luctant to share their vision with other 
whites. I think there are two reasons 
for this. 
The first is a temptation to get so 
caught up in the excitement of a mass 
Black campaign that we stay right there 
instead of reaching out to unplowed 
fields in the white community. In this 
campaign, we consciously combatted 
that tendency in Louisville when a few 
of us insisted early on that we call 
special meetings of white campaign 
workers (with the Black leadership) to 
plan outreach. 
Some white activists argued against 
this, and I myself usually don't believe 
in separate white meetings. In this case 
it was necessary, and it worked. It 
forced us to plan approaches to varied 
constituencies and organizations, to 
make assignments, and do check-up. 
We still did not do as much as we 
should have, but because of this ap-
proach we did involve whites who had 
never been active in anti-racist 
movements. And on caucus day we 
carried one predominantly white 
legislative district and had sizeable 
white turnouts in others. 
The other factor inhibiting adequate 
white outreach is a lack of faith that we 
can convince other white people to take 
an anti-racist path. Unconsciously, we 
are saying that we are smarter than 
everybody else, we can see these things, 
but other whites can't. 
The fact is that masses of white peo-
ple are able to understand that a Black 
candidate represents their best interests 
Page Seven 
The Jackson Campaign 
- if someone will just go to them and 
talk straight talk. Reverend Jackson 
himself said that wherever he could 
speak directly to poor and working 
white people he got votes. That hap-
pened with white farmers in Missouri, 
white miners in West Virginia, unem-
ployed steelworkers in Pennsylvania, 
poor white people in Tennessee. 
Jackson campaign workers found 
the same thing wherever they reached 
out beyond their own friends. To do 
this, you've got to go door-to-door, to 
get directly to people who won't come, 
initially, to your rallies. I know of very 
few places in the South where door-to-
door work in white communities hap-
pened in this campaign. Where it did, it 
worked. For example, David Martin, a 
white community activist with a union 
background in Winston-Salem, knock-
ed on 300 doors in his white middle-
income working-class neighborhood. 
'' About one-third of the people were 
hostile," he said, "the rest were glad to 
talk, some listened, and I believe voted 
for Jackson and a local Black can-
didate.' 
Law students at the University of 
Virginia went door-to-door in Char-
lottesville, and students and faculty of 
James Madison College in Harrison-
burg, Va. In both places, whites came 
out to caucuses for Jackson. Southern 
Baptist Seminary students did similar 
work in Louisville. 
In Nashville, white and Black Jack-
son workers did voter registration 
wearing Jackson T-shirts and buttons 
in white and mixed communities. They 
carried predominantly white precincts. 
Janet Wolf, white Tennessee Hunger 
Coalition activist, said: "Whenever we 
had time to talk about the issues, we 
got white votes." 
It can be done, and this is our chal-
lenge for the future. Blacks in this 
country have always generated our 
movements toward social change; but 
sheer numbers dictate that we must 
mobilize white America to follow that 
leadership in order to build a move-
ment strong enough to change the na-
tion's priorities from death to life. 
Jesse Jackson has opened the door 
to such coalition-building. I've heard 
some whites say they didn't know how 
to work in the Jackson campaign be-
cause they didn't feel welcome. I don't 
understand that, unless they were look-
ing for an engraved invitation or red-
carpet treatment. There may be ex-
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ceptions, but I don't know of a place in 
the South - and perhaps not in the na-
tion - where any white who really 
wanted to work to get white votes 
could not have become a part of this 
campaign. 
Blacks wanted the Rainbow. This 
was dramatically demonstrated in my 
community, where I became the bene-
ficiary by being elected a delegate (and 
then because of gender-balance prob-
lems an alternate) to the Democratic 
National Convention. I told friends in 
San Francisco I was there as a product 
of ''affirmative action and a quota 
system.'' The predominantly Black 
caucus in our congressional district had 
voted unanimously to give one of the 
three delegates slots they had won for 
Jackson to a white. This was a momen-
tous decision: they gave up one of three 
precious seats because of belief in that 
dream, which is still all it is, of the 
Rainbow. 
This also happened in Lexington, 
Ky., and some other places, where the 
predominantly Black congressional 
district caucus elected a delegation of 
two Blacks and one white. 
The vision is there, the door is open. 
The next move is up to us who are 
white. 
Anne Braden is co-chair of the 
Southern Organizing Committee for 
Economic and Social Justice (SOC) 
Some Recent Gra·nts 
Central America Research Institute, 
PO Box 4797, Berkeley, CA 94704. 
This group formed in 1981 under 
the name of the U .S.-El Salvador 
Research and Information Center. 
Their original purpose was to provide 
information to the U.S. public on the 
conflict in El Salvador and the U.S. 
role in that conflict. Their work has 
expanded to include all of Central 
America and the U.S. role in the con-
flicts in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and continued presence in 
Honduras. In addition to services 
they provide activists in the Bay area, 
the Institute publishes a monthly en-
titled Central America Bulletin which 
is the only monthly publication in the 
U.S. which exclusively covers events 
in Central America. Some recent 
topics in the Bulletin were: the 
Catholic church in El Salvador, the 
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military in Guatemala, and the U.S. 
churches in Central America. Resist's 
grant was used for a subscription 
mailing. Subscriptions to the Bulletin 
are available for $15/year from the 
above address. 
Women for Women in Lebanon, PO 
Box 9, Porter Square Station, Cam-
bridge, MA 02140. 
Women for Women is a Boston 
based group of Middle Eastern and 
North American women who original-
ly came together in response to the 
1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
This group sites two purposes for its 
work: to raise money to support in-
come generating women's projects in 
South Lebanon and to provide infor-
mation to the public about women's 
lives in Lebanon and the rest of the 
Arab world. Events sponsored by 
Women for Women include film 
screenings, workshops, cultural 
events, study discussion about the 
Middle East, and art exhibits. They 
also set up literature tables at Boston 
area events. Recently they started 
work on a slide show about Middle 
Eastern women's lives. Resist's grant 
helped Women for Women purchase 
a slide projector to use for produc-
tion and for showings. 
Arkansas Civil Liberties Union, PO 
Box 2832, Little Rock, AR 72203. 
Faced with combatting a well-
financed right wing anti-abortion ef-
fort in the Arkansas state legislature, 
the ACLU approached Resist for fun-
ding. At the time they had several 
grants pending with other progressive 
foundations but immediate financing 
was necessary if their effort to com-
bat the anti-choice campaign was to 
have any success. Resist's grant 
helped them produce important pam-
phlets and flyers. 
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